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HOW MUCH DO WE REALLY KNOW ABOUT RACE AND
JURIES? A REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORY AND
RESEARCH
SAMUEL R. SOMMERS* AND PHOEBE C. ELLSWORTH**
INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed numerous high-profile criminal
trials in which controversial verdicts have been attributed to race-
the race of the defendant, the racial composition of a jury, an attorney
"playing the race card," and so on. A predominantly Black jury's
acquittal of O.J. Simpson and White jurors' leniency in the police
brutality cases of Rodney King and Amadou Diallo not only sparked
public debate, but also led to rioting and violence. In the wake of
trials such as these, many have questioned the viability of the Ameri-
can jury system.' More specific questions regarding the influence of
race on jury decision making also emerge from this spate of well-
publicized cases: How does a defendant's race influence jurors'
perception and judgment? How does the racial composition of a jury
affect its deliberations and final decision? Is the influence of race on
jurors the same in all criminal trials?
Given the often polarizing nature of debates surrounding race,
we believe that empirical analysis is essential to the effort to under-
stand the relationship between race and criminal jury decision mak-
ing. There are three main methodologies that researchers use in
examining this relationship: (1) archival analysis of verdicts in actual
cases; (2) post-trial interviews with jurors; and (3) mock juror experi-
ments in which different versions of a trial summary are presented to
research participants in a controlled setting. Each of these method-
* Assistant Professor of Psychology, Tufts University. B.A. 1997, Williams College;
Ph.D. in Social Psychology 2002, University of Michigan.
** Robert B. Zajonc Collegiate Professor of Psychology, Kirkland and Ellis Professor of
Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1966, Harvard-Radcliffe College; Ph.D. in Social Psychology
1970, Stanford University.
1. See, e.g., ANDREAS KAPARDIS, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
(1997); RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: How RACE AFFECTS JURY TRIALS
(Gerald A. Reynolds ed., 1996) [hereinafter RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM].
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ologies has strengths and weaknesses, and of course, specific studies
of all three types vary in terms of the rigor of their design and the
quality of their execution. In this Article, we will briefly review the
use of archival analysis and juror interviews in the investigation of
race before turning to a more thorough examination of experimental
studies on the topic.
A. Archival Analysis
In many respects, archival analysis of actual trial outcomes is an
ideal way to study the relationship between race and jury verdicts.
Through the selection of a large enough number of cases from a given
jurisdiction or period of time, researchers can use statistical analysis
to identify specific factors that predict an increase or decrease in the
likelihood of jury convictions. The difficulty inherent in this type of
investigation is that criminal trials vary along a wide range of dimen-
sions. In order to examine the relationship between a defendant's
race and jury verdicts, for example, a researcher must account for an
extraordinary number of nonracial variables, including type and
severity of crime, quality of defendant's legal representation, defen-
dant's socioeconomic status, and jury composition. To the extent that
there are potentially confounding variables that the researchers are
not aware of or are not able to measure and control for statistically,
their conclusions regarding race are at best limited and at worst
misleading.
Despite these obstacles, there are notable examples of rigorous
archival analyses of race and jury decisions. For instance, David
Baldus and his colleagues examined more than 2,000 capital murder
cases from Georgia in the 1970s and found that defendants charged
with killing a White victim were 4.3 times as likely to receive the
death penalty as were defendants convicted of killing a Black victim.2
In order to arrive at this conclusion, Baldus controlled for scores of
nonracial variables and found that none of them could account for the
observed pattern of racial discrimination, either alone or in combina-
tion with one another. Despite the carefully designed and controlled
nature of these analyses, however, the Supreme Court dismissed this
study as inconclusive in that "Professor Baldus does not contend that
his statistics prove that race enters into any capital sentencing deci-
2. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990).
[Vol178:997
2003] HOW MUCH DO WE REALLY KNOW ABOUT RACE AND JURIES? 999
sions or that race was a factor in [a] particular case."3 Though we
believe that the Baldus data are far more compelling than the Court
recognized, it does remain true that even the most well-conceived of
archival analyses can at best discover "a discrepancy that appears to
correlate with race,"'4 as opposed to demonstrating a causal relation-
ship between race and jury decisions.
Of course, there are also examples of archival analyses of race
that are not particularly objective or persuasive-just because re-
search includes real cases does not mean it is well designed. In 1996,
the Center for Equal Opportunity ("CEO") published a report with a
thesis asserting that the U.S. legal system is biased in favor of Afri-
can-Americans.5 According to its authors, the central argument of
this report-that Black jurors are unwilling to convict Black defen-
dants-was based on an archival analysis of over 55,000 cases that
revealed lower conviction rates for Black defendants than for Whites.
Unlike the Baldus study, however, the CEO report failed to consider
alternative explanations for the observed data. For example, the
report never acknowledged the possibility that prosecutors are more
likely to press forward with a weak case when the defendant is a
minority, thereby providing juries with more opportunities to acquit
Black defendants. Moreover, in a detailed exploration of the CEO
data, Roger Parloff cast doubt on the reliability and significance of
the reported racial difference in the first place.6 His investigation
revealed that the sample of "over 55,000 actual cases" cited was
actually a weighted sample of only 3,000 actual cases. In addition, the
CEO analyses combined cases ending in dismissal and those ending in
acquittal, creating a broader outcome category of "nonconvictions."
This means that their controversial claim of pervasive nullification
among Black jurors was based on a few sensational anecdotes and a
sample of only eighty actual jury acquittals.7
In sum, the advantage of archival analyses is that they examine
actual trial outcomes and explore the relationships among variables
that occur in real courtrooms. As the Baldus and CEO examples
illustrate, however, this fact alone is not sufficient to ensure the
methodological rigor of such investigations; even the most well-
3. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987).
4. Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
5. See RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 1.
6. Roger Parloff, Speaking of Junk Science..., AM. LAW., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 5.
7. Id. at 6.
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designed archival analyses of race and jury outcomes face the inter-
pretive difficulties of controlling for confounding variables and the
limitations posed by a correlational research design.
B. Post- Trial Juror Interviews
Another common way in which researchers examine variables
related to jury decision making is through interviews with jurors after
a trial has ended. As with archival analysis, a strength of this meth-
odology is that it involves the study of real trials and jurors. Locating
and interviewing jurors requires a great deal of time and other
resources, and as a result these studies tend to sample fewer cases
than do archival analyses. But juror interviews have the added
benefit of allowing researchers to examine more than just the final
decision rendered by the jury. In interviews, for example, researchers
can assess jurors' perceptions of specific witnesses, items of evidence,
and the tone and content of their deliberations.
Juror interviews face many of the same methodological obstacles
as archival analyses. It is difficult to compare the experiences or
impressions of jurors across different "types" or "categories" of cases
(e.g., trials with White vs. Black defendants, cases from different
geographical regions or jurisdictions) due to the large number of
confounding variables that may contribute to the observed differ-
ences. As with archival analysis, such comparisons are also only
correlational in nature. As a result, juror interview studies of race in
the courtroom have often focused on the easily identifiable variable
of juror race by comparing the experiences of White and Black jurors
(and, less frequently, jurors of other racial groups as well).8
Another limitation of the juror interview technique is that these
investigations rely entirely on jurors' self-reported perceptions and
their memory of their experiences. It is a well-documented psycho-
logical finding that people frequently lack the ability to identify
accurately the factors that influence their judgment and behavior.9
Self-report data are particularly problematic when it comes to ques-
8. See, e.g., William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical
Analysis of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 171 (2001); Nancy
S. Marder, Juries, Justice, and Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659 (2002).
9. See, e.g., Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977).
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tions about the sensitive issue of race. 10 In general, jurors may not be
aware of the ways in which they are influenced by race, or they might
intentionally provide misleading or incomplete answers to direct
questions about racial issues.
The difficulties inherent in examining race in the courtroom us-
ing this methodology are illuminated by the inconsistent results
reported in two recent juror interview studies. William Bowers and
colleagues investigated the role of juror race in capital sentencing
decisions by examining interviews with over 1,000 jurors from 340
trials across fourteen states." Their findings indicated that in cases
with a Black defendant and White victim, Black jurors were more
likely than White jurors to perceive the jury as closed-minded,
intolerant of disagreement, or in a hurry to make a decision; to report
feeling like an outsider during the deliberations; and to express regret
about the jury's ultimate sentencing decision. On the other hand,
Nancy Marder's recent questionnaire study of jurors from twenty-six
criminal juries in Los Angeles revealed no consistent racial differ-
ences in jurors' self-reported perceptions and experiences. 2 Marder
reported that the racial diversity of the jury did not predict jurors'
ratings of hostility during deliberations, their perception of the
thoroughness of these deliberations, or their personal satisfaction
with the outcome of the case.
In sum, whereas juror interview studies provide researchers with
a wider array of empirical information than do strictly archival
analyses, their results, too, are correlational and limited by concerns
about confounding variables. Furthermore, jurors' answers to explicit
questions about the controversial topic of race may be of dubious
validity when it comes to identifying the influence of racial issues.
Jurors who are willing to answer researchers' questions about racial
issues may be unable or unwilling to provide accurate assessments of
how their decisions were influenced by race. Questions regarding
race may also lead to low response rates from potential interview
participants, which is problematic if those jurors who refuse to be
interviewed are the ones who were most affected by race during the
course of the trial and deliberations.
10. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995).
11. Bowers et al., supra note 8, at 259. This study also examined the actual sentencing
decisions of each jury, and in this manner combined aspects of both archival analysis and post-
trial juror interviews in its design.
12. See generally Marder, supra note 8, at 687-700.
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C. Mock Juror Experiments
A third means of investigating the relationship between race and
jury decision making uses the experimental methodology of social
psychology. By examining the judgments of mock jurors in response
to a trial simulation or condensed trial summary, researchers can
control and isolate variables of interest, allowing for conclusions
about causal relationships. For example, a researcher interested in
the influence of a defendant's race on juror judgments could present
participants with two versions of the same set of trial facts, one in
which the defendant is identified as White and one in which the
defendant is identified as Black.13 Assuming that juries have been
randomly assigned to receive one of these two trial versions, any
differences in their subsequent judgments of the case can be logically
attributed to the influence of the defendant's race.
The strengths of the mock juror paradigm directly complement
the weaknesses of analyses of real trials. In a well-designed experi-
ment, the only differences between versions of the trial in question
are those variables manipulated by the researcher. This eliminates
potential confounds and allows researchers to examine more than the
simple correlation between factors such as the defendant's race, jury
racial composition, jury verdicts, and sentencing decisions. In a
similar vein, the limitations of mock juror studies can be addressed by
parallel investigations using real cases. Oft-cited weaknesses of mock
juror research include the common use of college students as partici-
pants, the reliance on written trial summaries instead of live testi-
mony, the failure to provide jurors with standard jury instructions,
and the fact that the decisions rendered by mock juries have no real
world consequences. 4 The complementary nature of these different
research designs-analysis of real trials and former jurors on the one
hand, mock juror experiments on the other-suggests that any
13. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom:
Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1367 (2000) [hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom]; Samuel R. Sommers &
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Racial Prejudice against Black
Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 201 (2001) [hereinafter
Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias].
14. See, e.g., J. L. Bernard, Interaction Between the Race of the Defendant and That of
Jurors in Determining Verdicts, 5 LAW. & PSYCHOL. REV. 103 (1979); Nancy J. King, Postcon-
viction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92
MICH. L. REV. 63 (1993).
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investigation of the relationship between race and juries is best served
by the use of multiple methodologies.
Nonetheless, legal scholarship about race and juries rarely turns
to social science research for illumination. One explanation for this
fact is that legal writers are often interested in the constitutional
principles of racial representation rather than in its actual conse-
quences. For example, it may be wrong to focus peremptory chal-
lenges on Blacks because Black citizens have an equal right to serve
on juries, regardless of whether their presence would make any
difference in the verdict or deliberations. 5 It is also likely that many
in legal circles are simply satisfied with the assumption that Black
jurors and racially mixed juries are more lenient to Black defen-
dants.16
There are two major law review articles that have attempted to
review social science research on juries and the related empirical
literature. Both arrived at the strong conclusion that the underrepre-
sentation of Blacks on criminal juries creates a serious bias against
Black defendants. In the earlier of the two, published in 1985, Sheri
Lynn Johnson pointed out that although social science data have been
criticized in some cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education,7
because the data were too sparse or too questionable to rely on, when
it comes to racial bias in jury decision making, "the empirical evi-
dence is ... consistent and convincing.' 18
In 1993, Nancy King updated and extended Johnson's review of
the empirical research on race and juries. 9 Her synthesis of the
conclusions of these studies was accurate: some have found evidence
of racial bias, while others have not. Overall, though, King deter-
mined that the empirical evidence of racial bias was strong:
"[W]henever a connection exists.., white jurors are harsher with
black defendants and more lenient with those charged with crimes
against black victims than black jurors." 20
King also went on to identify the specific kinds of trials in which
the effects of a juror's race would be most powerful, concluding that
cases where racial issues were particularly salient would be the ones
15. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
16. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1704
(1985).
19. King, supra note 14.
20. Id. at 85.
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that would be most likely to elicit racial bias in White jurors: "For
example, the studies would support a finding of a high probability of
prejudice from jury discrimination if a black defendant could estab-
lish that he was convicted and sentenced to death for killing a white
police officer by an all-white jury that heard racial epithets during
trial and deliberations .... "21 In other words, the more blatant the
racial issues in the case, the higher the risk of racial bias in the jury.
The Supreme Court has also endorsed the idea that the risk of racial
prejudice is greatest in cases that are obviously racially charged. In
Powers v. Ohio, the Court stated that doubts about jury neutrality
would be aggravated "if race is implicated in the trial, either in a
direct way as with an alleged racial motivation of the defendant or
victim, or in some more subtle manner as by casting doubt upon the
credibility or dignity of a witness.... "2
Although some legal scholars and judges may credit the evidence
of social science research when describing the prevalence of racial
bias or the type of cases where it is most likely to intrude, social
scientists themselves are far more hesitant. Many of the experiments
commonly cited with regard to the first issue, the prevalence of bias,
are flawed. On the question of the circumstances under which bias is
most likely, there are hardly any studies that directly address the
matter. Reading just the conclusions of the published studies, one
might infer that although there is not much research, what there is
consistently demonstrates White juror bias, especially in racially
charged cases. A close examination of the description of the methods
and results, however, where the researchers describe what they
actually did and what they actually found, often casts serious doubt
on these conclusions. In many of the studies the number of partici-
pants is very small and the results are not statistically significant.
Most striking, almost none of the research actually includes Black
participants in the same studies as Whites, so the conclusion that
Black jurors behave differently than White jurors remains largely
unsubstantiated. In sum, the hypothesis that White racial prejudice
plays an important role in jury decision making is certainly plausible,
as is the hypothesis that this prejudice is likely to be exacerbated in
cases that are racially charged, but the empirical evidence-for this
latter proposition in particular -is actually weak.
21. Id. at 100 n.138.
22. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 409, 412 (1991).
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D. Present Aims
The purpose of this Article is to present an updated and bal-
anced review of the frequently overlooked, and sometimes oversim-
plified, social science literature on race and jury decision making. In
Section I, we begin our review with an analysis of the most common
type of social science research on race and juries: studies of the
influence of a defendant's race on individual White mock jurors.
Rather than portray these studies as uniform and conclusive as some
writers have, it is our goal to contemplate the state of this literature
more critically, summarizing its varied findings as well as highlighting
apparent inconsistencies and methodological flaws. We will then
place these empirical findings within a broader framework of psycho-
logical theories of racial bias in Section II, in an attempt to make
sense of contradictory findings and to address the question of when
race is and is not likely to influence juries.
Section III examines the smaller number of studies that have
considered the judgments of non-White mock jurors, including the
few that directly compared the influence of race on White and Black
jurors. This review highlights the need for more investigations of
Black jurors, as well as additional theory and research regarding the
race-related attitudes and judgments of members of racial minority
groups in general. Another limitation of social science studies of race
in the courtroom is that most of this research focuses on the judg-
ments of individual jurors. In Section IV, we review a handful of
studies that examine decision making at the jury level, including a
detailed exploration of one recent experiment that included actual
jury pool members as participants and examined the social influence
processes through which racial composition may affect deliberations.
Finally, we offer concluding thoughts regarding the current state and
future directions of social science research on race and juries, and
reiterate the importance of utilizing multiple methods in any empiri-
cal investigation of the legal system.
I. INVESTIGATIONS OF DEFENDANT'S RACE AND WHITE JURORS
In light of recent media scrutiny of the role race plays in the legal
system-not to mention the societal importance of the issue- the lack
of social science research on race and jury decision making is surpris-
ing. Just three years ago, we reported that our own literature search
for psychological research on race in the courtroom yielded fewer
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than thirty studies published since 1990.23 The vast majority of this
research focused on the influence of a defendant's race on the judg-
ments of individual mock jurors who were not asked to deliberate.
Most of these studies used a similar experimental method, manipulat-
ing a defendant's race in a written trial summary or transcript given to
mock jurors. In all but a handful of cases, these investigations were
confined to the study of White jurors.24
A. Empirical Evidence of White Juror Bias
While their results are not entirely consistent, several mock juror
studies in the past two decades reveal evidence of White juror bias
against Black defendants. In one such investigation, Klein and
Creech showed White mock jurors a seven-minute video summary of
a rape trial in which the defendant was either depicted as White or
Black. 25 They found that individual jurors who watched the Black
defendant version were more likely to believe he was guilty than
jurors who saw the same trial video with a White defendant. Other
researchers have obtained comparable results using various trial
summaries, including Pfeifer's study of an assault case,2 6 and Hymes
and colleagues' rape study.27 Similar biases have also been reported
for Whites' sentencing decisions. Sweeney and Haney's statistical
review of fourteen studies indicated that White mock jurors recom-
mended longer sentences for Black than for White defendants. 28 A
1997 experiment by DeSantis and Kayson provided more recent
evidence of biased sentencing recommendations in a burglary case.
29
Other studies have built on these findings by demonstrating that
White juror bias is more likely in some trial situations than in others.
James Johnson and colleagues, for example, identified the presence
23. Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 13.
24. The few exceptions to this tendency (i.e., studies that included non-White jurors) are
reviewed in Section III of this Article.
25. See Kitty Klein & Blanche Creech, Race, Rape, and Bias: Distortion of Prior Odds and
Meaning Changes, 3 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 21 (1982).
26. Jeffrey E. Pfeifer, Mock Juror Decision-Making and Modern Racism: An Examination
of the Role of Task and Target Specificity on Judgmental Evaluations, in DISSERTATION
ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL 52 (1992).
27. Robert W. Hymes et al., Acquaintance Rape: The Effect of Race of Defendant and Race
of Victim on White Juror Decisions, 133 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 627 (1993).
28. Laura T. Sweeney & Craig Haney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-
Analytic Review of Experimental Studies, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 179 (1992).
29. Andrea DeSantis & Wesley A. Kayson, Defendants' Characteristics of Attractiveness,
Race, and Sex and Sentencing Decisions, 81 PSYCHOL. REP. 679 (1997).
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of inadmissible evidence at trial as one such determining factor. 30
White mock jurors in this study were presented with the written
summary of a bank robbery trial in which the defendant was either
White or Black. In the baseline control version of the trial, the
prosecution's case was circumstantial and ambiguous. In two experi-
mental versions, the prosecution introduced a wiretap that suggested
that the defendant had lied to police about his whereabouts at the
time of the crime; this evidence was ruled either admissible or inad-
missible. Results indicated that White mock jurors ignored this
incriminating evidence when the defendant was White but not when
he was Black.
Jeffrey Pfeifer and colleagues have suggested that judicial in-
structions also determine whether or not White jurors exhibit racial
bias.31 In one such study, mock jurors were given a rape trial tran-
script in which the defendant's race, as well as the presence or ab-
sence of jury instructions was varied. In the absence of jury
instructions, White mock jurors gave higher guilt ratings to the Black
defendant than the White defendant. Other White jurors were given
instructions that emphasized the importance of juror impartiality and
the requirement that jurors be "free from sympathy or prejudice. '32
These instructions eliminated any evidence of juror bias. Lynch and
Haney came to similar conclusions regarding the influence of judicial
instructions: the poorer their mock jurors' comprehension of judicial
instructions, the more likely they were to demonstrate racial bias in a
capital sentencing decision. 3
In addition to inadmissible evidence and judicial instructions,
crime type has also been found to affect the likelihood of White juror
bias. Sunnafrank and Fontes concluded that jurors have stereotypes
about the types of crimes that people of different races tend to
commit. 34 For example, they found that White jurors viewed white-
30. James D. Johnson et al., Justice is Still Not Colorblind: Differential Racial Effects of
Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 893 (1995).
31. See, e.g., Erick L. Hill & Jeffrey E. Pfeifer, Nullification Instructions and Juror Guilt
Ratings: An Examination of Modern Racism, 16 CONTEMP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 6 (1992); Jeffrey E.
Pfeifer & James R. Ogloff, Ambiguity and Guilt Determinations: A Modern Racism Perspective,
21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1713 (1991).
32. Pfeifer & Ogloff, supra note 31, at 1718.
33. Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension: Guided
Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 337 (2000).
34. See Michael Sunnafrank & Norman E. Fontes, General and Crime Related Racial
Stereotypes and Influence on Juridic Decisions, 17 CORNELL J. Soc. REL. 1 (1983). For further
evidence of the influence of racial stereotypes on the information processing of jurors, see also
Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and Memory: Testing
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collar crimes-such as counterfeiting and embezzlement-as consis-
tent with a stereotype of White criminals. On the other hand, more
violent crimes such as assault and robbery were associated with a
Black criminal stereotype. These data led Sunnafrank and Fontes to
suggest that the stereotypicality of a crime influences whether or not
jurors demonstrate racial bias. In a direct test of this hypothesis,
Gordon found that White mock jurors were indeed more likely to
demonstrate racial bias when a Black defendant committed a stereo-
typic (i.e., violent) crime.35
B. Studies Failing To Indicate White Juror Bias
However, not all mock juror studies have found that White ju-
rors demonstrate bias against Black defendants. Some researchers
have arrived at the surprising conclusion that White jurors are biased
against White defendants. In one such study, McGowen and King
varied the race and socioeconomic status ("SES") of the defendant in
a written assault case. 36 The mock jurors, all of whom were White,
recommended significantly longer sentences for the White defendant
than the Black defendant. Unfortunately, the manipulation in this
study confounded the variables of race and SES: the defendant was
depicted as either a high-SES White or a low-SES Black. It is there-
fore impossible to separate the effects of defendant race and SES on
mock jurors.
Poulson arrived at a similar result in an investigation of the in-
sanity defense. 37 He presented mock jurors with an audiotaped
summary of a murder trial in which the defendant's race was con-
veyed using a photograph slide show. When their individual verdict
preferences were assessed, White mock jurors were found to be more
likely to acquit the Black defendant by reason of insanity than the
White defendant. However, this study's focus on the insanity defense
makes it difficult to generalize these results to other, more typical
Process Models of Stereotype Use, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 726 (1988); Galen V.
Bodenhausen & Meryl Lichtenstein, Social Stereotypes and Information-Processing Strategies:
The Impact of Task Complexity, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 871 (1987).
35. Randall A. Gordon, The Effect of Strong Versus Weak Evidence on the Assessment of
Race Stereotypic and Race Nonstereotypic Crimes, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 734 (1993).
36. Ramsey McGowen & Glen D. King, Effects of Authoritarian, Anti-Authoritarian, and
Egalitarian Legal Attitudes on Mock Juror and Jury Decisions, 51 PsYCHOL. REP. 1067 (1982).
37. Ronald L. Poulson, Mock Juror Attribution of Criminal Responsibility: Effects of Race
and the Guilty But Mentally III (GBMI) Verdict Option, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1596
(1990).
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trials. To the extent that White jurors view mental illness or "insan-
ity" as more consistent with their stereotype of Black versus White
defendants, Poulson's finding of same-race bias becomes less surpris-
ing.
Still other researchers have concluded that a defendant's race has
no reliable influence on White mock jurors. For example, Skolnick
and Shaw presented Whites with a murder trial summary in which the
defendant's race was varied.38 They found that White mock jurors'
guilt ratings were about the same for the White and Black defendants.
Again, though, the generalizability of these findings is dubious. This
study was conducted for a special journal issue devoted to the O.J.
Simpson trial, and Skolnick and Shaw designed their trial materials to
resemble the Simpson case. Furthermore, the study was run in
Southern California while Simpson's civil trial was ongoing, and the
authors cautioned against interpreting their results outside of this
unique context.
In general, it is difficult to judge the persuasiveness of individual
mock juror studies that have reported no evidence of White juror bias
because their conclusions are based upon statistically nonsignificant,
null results.39 The most rigorous social science support for the claim
that White jurors' individual judgments are not influenced by a
defendant's race is provided by Mazzella and Feingold's meta-
analysis of over eighty studies with more than 6,000 participants. 40
However, only ten of the studies included in this analysis (which also
investigated the attractiveness, gender, and SES of defendants)
actually examined the influence of race on jurors' guilt judgments,
and only two of them were published after 1990. Once again, the
authors themselves caution against overinterpretation of these results
regarding defendant race, writing that "the finding of no general
effects of race.., was misleading because race apparently interacted
complexly with other factors in influencing jurors' judgments of
guilt."41
38. Paul Skolnick & Jerry I. Shaw, The 0. J. Simpson Criminal Trial Verdict: Racism or
Status Shield?, 53 J. SOC. ISSUES 503 (1997).
39. See, e.g., Mary V. McGuire & Gordon Bermant, Individual and Group Decisions in
Response to a Mock Trial: A Methodological Note, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 220 (1997);
Stephanie Nickerson et al., Racism in the Courtroom, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND
RACISM 255 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
40. Ronald Mazzella & Alan Feingold, The Effects of Physical Attractiveness, Race,
Socioeconomic Status, and Gender of Defendants and Victims on Judgments of Mock Jurors: A
Meta-Analysis, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1315 (1994).
41. Id. at 1333.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
II. MAKING SENSE OF THE WHITE MOCK JUROR LITERATURE
Clearly no consensus has been reached regarding the influence of
a defendant's race on White mock jurors. Some studies have sug-
gested that White jurors are biased against Black defendants, others
have yielded no evidence of bias, and a few researchers have found
that White jurors are biased against White defendants. But substan-
tial evidence exists to support the conclusion of many legal scholars
that, at least under some conditions, White jurors exhibit racial bias in
their verdicts and sentencing decisions. Of course, this conclusion is
also consistent with the long history of discrimination suffered by
Black defendants within the U.S. legal system.42 In an attempt to
better understand the influence of a defendant's race on White jurors,
as well as the specific circumstances in which White juror bias is and
is not likely, we now turn to a brief review of psychological theories of
modern racism and a discussion of how these perspectives might be
applied to the study of juror decision making.
A. Social Psychological Theories of Racism
Over the past few decades, social psychologists have wrestled
with two seemingly irreconcilable observations regarding Whites'
racial attitudes and the pervasiveness of discrimination. On the one
hand, contemporary Whites are less likely to endorse explicitly racist
beliefs or to engage in acts of overt prejudice than were Whites of
previous eras.4 1 On the other hand, racial minorities continue to
experience discrimination on a personal and an institutional level,
both inside and outside of the laboratory.44 Explaining this apparent
disconnect between Whites' self-reported racial attitudes and the
actual experiences of non-Whites is the central goal of many theories
of modern racial bias.
Several psychologists have converged on the general conclusion
that White racism still exists in contemporary America, but the nature
42. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); Sommers &
Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra note 13, at 204.
43. See, e.g., John B. McConahay, Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism
Scale, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, supra note 39, at 91.
44. See, e.g., Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discrimina-
tion and Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546 (1980); Patricia G. Devine,
Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1990); Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism,
in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, supra note 39, at 61.
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and manifestations of this bias have changed over time .4 This "new"
form of racism has been referred to by a variety of names, including
modern racism, symbolic racism, subtle racism, and aversive racism.
Terminology aside, these theories share a common assumption that
most Whites are no longer as likely to demonstrate the overt, "red-
necked" form of prejudice that was common in this country only a
short time ago.4 Because contemporary racial norms have shifted
towards egalitarianism, the argument goes, explicit demonstration of
racism is frowned upon in most circles. But Whites' outward accep-
tance of a nonprejudiced value system has not led to the end of racial
bias. Instead, theorists have suggested, many modern Whites express
anti-Black sentiment through more subtle, symbolic, or "acceptable"
means. Whites' racial attitudes might manifest themselves through
opposition to social policies designed to facilitate equality, such as
affirmative action.4 1 Whites may also express subtle prejudice
through the endorsement of opinions such as "[b]lacks are getting too
demanding in their push for equal rights."
Moreover, theorists have offered predictions about the circum-
stances in which Whites are most likely to express bias. In their
theory of aversive racism, Gaertner and Dovidio proposed that all
Americans are aware of anti-Black stereotypes by virtue of their birth
into a historically racist culture. 49 Still, many Whites embrace egali-
tarianism and make a conscious effort to behave in a nonprejudiced
fashion. As long as this egalitarian motivation is active-which tends
to occur when race is salient in a situation or when normative cues to
avoid bias are strong-Whites can often successfully avoid prejudice.
However, in some situations, the prejudicial attitudes and beliefs that
linger in their consciousness emerge and influence behavior. When
race is not salient or normative cues regarding prejudice are absent,
Gaertner and Dovidio predict that Whites' motivation to avoid
prejudice will not be triggered. In such situations, Whites frequently
let down their guard and demonstrate bias. Numerous empirical
studies have provided support for this theory. In a series of labora-
tory experiments reported by Gaertner and Dovidio, Whites who
45. See, e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 44, at 61; Donald R. Kinder & David 0.
Sears, Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life, 40 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 414 (1981); McConahay, supra note 43, at 91.
46. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 44, at 62.
47. Kinder & Sears, supra note 45, at 415.
48. McConahay, supra note 43, at 104.
49. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 44.
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claimed to have an egalitarian motivation were nevertheless quicker
to associate negative personality traits with Blacks and positive
personality traits with Whites. 0 These results are consistent with
findings other researchers have obtained using a variety of popula-
tions and methods, 1 and they lead to the conclusion that even Whites
who sincerely believe themselves to be nonprejudiced often harbor
anti-Black sentiment that influences their behavior.
Experiments in more natural settings have also demonstrated the
subtle nature of modern racial bias. In another study reported by
Gaertner and Dovidio, experimenters pretended to be stranded
motorists and phoned unsuspecting Whites to ask for assistance. 2
Each "motorist," whose race was identifiable from his dialect, ex-
plained that he was using a pay phone because his car had broken
down. The caller stated that he used his last coin to make this call but
must have dialed the wrong number. He then asked if the participant
would phone a tow truck on his behalf. After hearing the entire plea,
White participants belonging to a liberal political party, who pre-
sumably had strong egalitarian beliefs, were more likely to help the
Black than White caller. As the researchers explained, "[f]ailure to
offer assistance to a black person once the necessity for help has been
recognized would violate prescriptions for appropriate behavior and
could be attributed to racial antipathy."53 But a substantial number of
participants hung up before hearing about the caller's need for
assistance, and it was the Black motorist who suffered a dispropor-
tionate number of these premature hang-ups. Before the caller
voiced his need for help and triggered normative pressures against
hanging up, Whites discriminated against the Black motorist without
concerns about appearing racist.
B. Applying Theory to the Courtroom
These theories about racism have obvious implications for the
investigation of juror bias. More precisely, consideration of the
situational antecedents of racial bias may lead to more specific
hypotheses regarding the frequency and nature of White juror bias.
For example, Gaertner and Dovidio concluded that Whites are less
50. Id. at 81.
51. See, e.g., Devine, supra note 44; Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 10.
52. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 44, at 68.
53. Id. at 69.
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likely to demonstrate racial bias when concerns about prejudice are
salient.5 4 In direct contrast to the assumptions of some legal schol-
ars, 5 5 this observation has led us to propose the hypothesis that White
jurors may be less influenced by a defendant's race when a trial is
racially charged and they are reminded of concerns about racism.5 6
There are many ways in which racial issues can be made salient at
trial, including an obvious racial motivation for the crime in question,
an attorney's attempt to "play the race card," or the presence of race-
related pretrial publicity.
The results of several mock juror experiments are consistent with
this hypothesis. In one study, Steven Fein and his colleagues exam-
ined the influence of pretrial publicity on mock jurors.57 They found
that individual White mock jurors' verdict preferences in a case with a
Black defendant were influenced by inadmissible newspaper articles
given to them before the trial transcript. But when mock jurors were
also given information suggesting that the media's treatment of the
defendant in this case was racially motivated, they no longer demon-
strated this bias. Once concerns about racism were made salient in
the experimental situation, White mock jurors rendered unbiased
decisions based only on the admissible facts of the case. Pfeifer and
Ogloff's finding that explicit instructions to avoid "sympathy or
prejudice" eliminated the influence of the defendant's race on mock
jurors can be interpreted in a similar manner.58
Further support for the hypothesis that blatantly racial issues at
trial make White juror bias less likely is provided by mock juror
studies that have failed to find evidence of racism. Skolnick and
Shaw, for example, found that White jurors were not influenced by a
defendant's race when judging a trial summary that was similar to the
racially charged O.J. Simpson case.59 In our previous research, we
also found no evidence of White juror bias when mock jurors were
presented with racially charged written trial summaries.60 These
results have led us to propose that the intuitive assumption that
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISEN-
FRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 5 (1993); King, supra note 14.
56. See Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 13, at 1372.
57. Steven Fein et al., Hype and Suspicion: The Effects of Pretrial Publicity, Race, and
Suspicion on Jurors' Verdicts, 53 J. SOC. ISSUES 487 (1997).
58. See Pfeifer & Ogloff, supra note 31, at 1718.
59. Skolnick & Shaw, supra note 38, at 510.
60. Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 13, at 1369.
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racially charged trials are most likely to elicit White juror prejudice
lacks empirical support, and may in fact be responsible for the
apparent dearth of research into race in the courtroom; many of the
studies that have used racially charged trial materials may have
wound up in psychologists' file drawers with nonsignificant, null
results.
Psychologists have suggested that racial bias among Whites is
more likely when salient norms regarding racism are absent. 61 In such
situations, White perceivers often let their guard down, allowing their
behavior to be influenced by anti-Black attitudes and prejudice. In
light of this finding, we believe that White juror bias may be most
likely when a trial is not racially charged and jurors' concerns about
racism are not made salient. In other words, it is the non-race-salient,
run-of-the-mill trial in which the defendant simply happens to be
Black that might be most likely to elicit White juror bias.
In support of this prediction are previous studies that found evi-
dence of juror bias by using trial materials that were not racially
charged. Gray and Ashmore, for example, presented participants
with a vehicular manslaughter trial in which racial issues were not
salient .6  They found that White mock jurors were more punitive
towards a Black defendant than a White defendant. Klein and
Creech obtained similar results using a non-racially charged rape
case.63  Sweeney and Haney explicitly attributed the finding that
White jurors demonstrate racial bias in sentencing decisions to the
fact that such "decisions may provide fertile ground for more modern,
subtle forms of racism to operate."64
C. Race-Salience as a Determinant of Bias
Of course, a more rigorous test of whether salient racial issues at
trial influence the likelihood of White juror bias requires varying
racial content within a particular trial. In 2000, we conducted such an
experiment by presenting 156 White mock jurors with the written
summary of an interracial assault trial. 65 The defendant in this case,
who was identified as either White or Black, was accused of knocking
61. See, e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 44, at 62.
62. David B. Gray & Richard B. Ashmore, Biasing Influence of Defendants' Characteristics
on Simulated Sentencing, 38 PSYCHOL. REP. 727 (1976).
63. Klein & Creech, supra note 25.
64. Sweeney & Haney, supra note 28, at 191.
65. Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 13, at 1372.
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down his girlfriend during a fight at a bar. In the race-salient version
of the trial summary, he allegedly yelled at the victim, "You know
better than to talk that way about a White (or Black) man in front of
his friends," providing a racial context for the incident in question. In
the non-race-salient version of the trial, this statement was modified
to read, "You know better than to talk that way about a man in front
of his friends." 66
The impact of this one-word race-salience manipulation was sub-
stantial. When racial issues were made salient in the case, individual
White mock jurors were equally likely to vote to convict the White
and Black defendant. When race was not salient, Whites gave higher
guilt ratings and longer sentence recommendations to the Black
defendant than to the White defendant. The proportion of White
jurors voting to convict the Black defendant rose from 73% in the
race-salient condition to 87% in the non-race-salient condition. The
influence of the race-salience manipulation was also evident in other
measures. In the non-race-salient condition, White jurors rated the
prosecution's case against the Black defendant as stronger than its
case against the White defendant; similarly, the defense of the Black
defendant was rated as significantly weaker than the White defen-
dant's defense. 67 These differences emerged even though the prose-
cution and defense cases were identical in the White and Black
defendant versions of the trial. No such bias was observed in White
jurors' judgments of the race-salient trial.
Furthermore, providing a racial context for the alleged assault
influenced White jurors' perceptions of the defendant himself. In the
non-race-salient condition, White jurors rated the Black defendant as
more violent and aggressive than the White defendant. This pattern
was reversed for positive personality characteristics: the White
defendant was perceived to be more honest and moral than the Black
defendant. 68 Compared to the White defendant, jurors were also
more likely to agree that the Black defendant would be arrested for a
similar crime in the future. 69 Once again, none of these differences
emerged when racial issues in the trial were salient.
66. Id. at 1373.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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In 2001, we replicated these results using a different trial.70 In
this study, White mock jurors were given the summary of an assault
case involving high school basketball teammates who got into a fight
in their locker room. The salience of racial issues in this trial was
manipulated through the testimony of a defense witness. In the race-
salient condition, an assistant coach testified that the defendant was
one of only two White (or Black) players on the team, and that there
had been racial tension in the locker room all season long. In the
non-race-salient condition, this witness provided a race-neutral
context for the altercation by testifying that the defendant had only
one other close friend on the team, and that there was a good deal of
social tension among the players. Once again, White mock jurors
were not influenced by the defendant's race when racial issues were
salient at trial, but in the trial that was not racially charged, jurors
were more likely to vote to convict the Black defendant (90% of
jurors voted to convict) than the White defendant (70% conviction
rate) 71
Taken together, these two studies provide support for the hy-
pothesis that White juror bias is actually more likely to occur in trials
without salient racial issues, where norms regarding race are weak-a
conclusion that is consistent with theories of modern racism. But as
the notoriety of O.J. Simpson's acquittal demonstrated, public debate
regarding race and the jury system is by no means confined to the
judgments of White jurors. Unfortunately, few psychologists have
included non-White mock jurors in their investigations of race and
jury decision making.72 And psychological theory is far less helpful
when it comes to studying non-White jurors because most theories of
modern racism also focus exclusively on the attitudes and judgments
of Whites.
III. COMPARING THE JUDGMENTS OF WHITE AND BLACK JURORS
For many years, the consensus among mock jury researchers was
that little if any consistent correlation existed between juror race and
70. Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra note 13.
71. Id. at 217.
72. A fact that has been noted by, among others, King, supra note 14, at 75; Jack P. Lipton,
Racism in the Jury Box: The Hispanic Defendant, 5 HISP. J. BEHAV. Sci. 275 (1983).
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verdict preference. 73 But the studies upon which this conclusion was
based were not likely to reveal between-race differences in juror
decision making. They were, for the most part, intended as investiga-
tions of nonracial issues such as evidence comprehension, case
complexity, jury size, and jury instructions, and most had too few non-
White jurors to permit valid statistical comparisons. In fact, partici-
pant race was often assessed for demographic purposes only, and null
results for race were usually reported as peripheral findings. Very
few studies have directly addressed the between-race question
germane to the research reviewed in the present Article: does a
defendant's race influence White and Black jurors differently? 74 The
handful of studies that varied a defendant's race in trials given to
White and Black mock jurors have, in fact, yielded evidence of
differences by juror race.
A. Race of Juror Studies
One study designed to compare the judgments of individual
White and Black mock jurors was conducted by Foley and Cham-
blin.71 Participants in this experiment listened to an audiotaped rape
trial in which the race of the defendant was varied. Replicating the
results of other studies, White jurors were more likely to vote to
convict the Black defendant than the White defendant. Black jurors,
on the other hand, were not influenced by the defendant's race. It is
important to note, though, that of the 191 participants in this study,
only 20 were Black, rendering it highly unlikely that statistically
significant results could have been obtained for Black jurors.
Studies with a reasonably large number of Black participants
have usually found that Black mock jurors are influenced by the race
of a defendant. Ugwuegbu, for example, manipulated the defendant's
73. See, e.g., REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 121-23 (1983); SAUL M. KASSIN &
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 29 (1988).
74. Due, in large part, to the long-standing and well-documented nature of White-on-Black
racism in American history, psychological research on prejudice traditionally has concerned
itself with this specific instantiation of racial bias. Social science research on race and juries has
followed this same lead, focusing mostly on White jurors' attitudes towards Black defendants,
and, to a lesser extent, Black jurors' judgments. Therefore, in this section of the Article, we
discuss the variable of juror race by comparing the decision making of White and Black jurors.
To this point in time, relatively little research has examined the judgment processes of jurors of
other racial minority groups.
75. Linda A. Foley & Minor H. Chamblin, The Effect of Race and Personality on Mock
Jurors' Decisions, 112 J. PSYCHOL. 47 (1982).
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race and the strength of the evidence in a rape trial summary given to
White and Black mock jurors.76 He found that in the presence of
marginal or strong prosecution evidence, both White and Black mock
jurors demonstrated ingroup/outgroup bias, judging the same-race
defendant more favorably than the other-race defendant. A direct
comparison of White and Black jurors' decision making in this
research is impossible, however, as Whites and Blacks participated in
separate experiments.
A handful of studies have indicated that the race of a defendant
affects Black jurors' judgments more than it affects Whites'. As
described above, Skolnick and Shaw found no evidence of racial bias
when they presented White mock jurors with a trial summary remi-
niscent of the O.J. Simpson case.77 Black mock jurors, though, gave
harsher guilt ratings and sentence recommendations to the White
defendant than the Black defendant in this study. We have reported
a similar result, demonstrating that the defendant's race in five
racially charged trial summaries had a greater influence on Black
jurors' judgments than on Whites'. 78  In their investigation of a
vehicular homicide case, Abwender and Hough also found evidence
of same-race leniency among Black, but not among White, mock
jurors.79
Finally, as detailed above, the CEO published a report in 1996
that took to the extreme this conclusion that race can have a greater
influence on Black versus White jurors. 80 Beyond the methodological
problems with this assertion, 81 the results of other studies comparing
White and Black jurors also fail to support the CEO's claim that
Blacks refuse to convict Black defendants. In many of the mock juror
studies reviewed above, Black jurors rated Black defendants as more
likely to be guilty than not and demonstrated conviction rates as high
as 80%.82 These data do not support the conclusion that widespread
race-based jury nullification occurs among Black jurors, despite the
suggestions of the CEO that such an epidemic currently exists or the
76. Denis C. Ugwuegbu. Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of Legal
Responsibility, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 133 (1979).
77. See Skolnick & Shaw, supra note 38, at 510.
78. Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 13, at 1373.
79. David A. Abwender & Kenyatta Hough, Interactive Effects of Characteristics of
Defendant and Mock Juror on U.S. Participants' Judgment and Sentencing Recommendations,
141 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 603 (2001).
80. See RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 1.
81. See Parloff, supra note 6.
82. See, e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 13, at 1373.
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proposition that such nullification should be encouraged in some
cases.83
B. Exploring the Judgments of Black Jurors
Unlike the study of White jurors, psychological theory about ra-
cism is not particularly helpful when it comes to understanding and
predicting the judgments of Black jurors. Theories such as modern
racism, symbolic racism, and aversive racism were devised specifically
to explain the racial attitudes and behavior of White Americans.
84
Since Black mock jurors might not experience the same conflict
between egalitarian norms and prejudicial beliefs that Whites do, the
applicability of these theories to the study of Black jurors' decision
making is questionable.
In fact, psychologists who have explored the racial attitudes of
minority individuals suggest that White and Black Americans experi-
ence very different normative pressures regarding race. Nicole
Shelton, for example, has argued that many Blacks are socialized in
environments that are mistrustful of the egalitarian claims of White
America.85 This conclusion suggests that as a result of personal
experiences with racial prejudice, Blacks may be less motivated than
Whites to conceal their own ingroup/outgroup biases. In some
instances, explicit ingroup preference among Blacks may even be
encouraged as a means of combating institutional racism.86 James
Jones has proposed a similar hypothesis, predicting that racial prefer-
ence is more "available to the consciousness" of Blacks and more
likely to be expressed by Blacks than by Whites.87 These conclusions
indicate that concerns about avoiding racial preference may vary by
race, and racial issues at trial might therefore influence White and
Black jurors differently.
Support for this assertion is provided by the findings of our pre-
vious research, in which the salience of racial issues at trial deter-
mined the effect of the defendant's race on White, but not Black
83. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, in AFRICAN AMERICAN CLASSICS IN CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
323 (Shaun L. Gabbidon & Helen T. Greene eds., 2002).
84. See sources cited supra note 44.
85. See generally J. Nicole Shelton, Blacks' Mistrust of Whites: Correlates and Impact on
Social Interactions (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
86. See Butler, supra note 83.
87. James M. Jones, Whites are from Mars, O.J. is from Planet Hollywood, in OFF WHITE:
READINGS ON RACE, POWER, AND SOCIETY 251 n.3 (Michelle Fine et al. eds., 1997).
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jurors.88 Compared to their judgments of the White defendant, Black
jurors in our study gave lower guilt ratings, shorter sentence recom-
mendations, and more positive personality evaluations to the Black
defendant, regardless of whether the trial was racially charged. This
study also uncovered other racial differences. White and Black jurors
were asked to respond to the following statement using a scale of 1
("Strongly Disagree") to 7 ("Strongly Agree"): "The race of a
defendant affects the treatment s/he receives in the legal system."
Black participants' average response to this item was 6.9, practically
at the maximum of the scale. This average response was significantly
higher than the 4.7 average of Whites, and indicates Black jurors'
skepticism about the fairness of the legal system. This is precisely the
type of mistrust that Shelton, Jones, and others have suggested might
lead Blacks to demonstrate racial preference. 89 Black mock jurors in
our study also tended to rate the trial as racially charged whenever
the defendant was Black, even when it was designed to be a non-race-
salient case. 90 In other words, the mere fact that the defendant was
Black seemed to be enough to make racial issues salient in the eyes of
Black jurors.
In light of these findings, one explanation for same-race leniency
among Black jurors is that they might sometimes attempt to "level the
playing field" for Black defendants. In response to perceived racial
inequities in the legal system, Black jurors may set the bar higher for
the prosecution in cases with Black defendants. More precisely, the
average Black juror might require a greater degree of certainty about
guilt before voting to convict a Black defendant than a White defen-
dant. Another possibility is that many Black jurors consciously adjust
their definitions of "reasonable doubt," rendering them more likely to
acquit when the defendant is Black.
But this same-race leniency effect can also be explained without
inferring any intent to bring about racial justice. The fact that Black
jurors-on average-become concerned about the fairness of the
legal system when judging the trial of a Black defendant may lead to
different interpretations of evidence when a defendant is Black and to
different "story" constructions regarding what really happened in the
88. Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 13, at 1373.
89. See Jones, supra note 87; Shelton, supra note 85.
90. Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 13, at 1373.
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incident in question.91 For example, Black jurors' perceptions of the
evidence might be influenced by concerns regarding the fairness of
the police investigation, the overzealousness of the prosecutor, or
other potential sources of bias. In fact, Jones has argued that both a
conscious motivation to combat bias and less deliberate perceptual
tendencies contribute to same-race leniency among Black jurors: "It
is probably true that the burden of proof is heavier when the evidence
is viewed through counternarrative scenario lenses, and the defendant
is a Black man." g
It therefore appears as if White and Black jurors bring to the
courtroom different concerns regarding racism. Many Whites,
according to theories of modern racism, are motivated to avoid
prejudice. As a result, White jurors may be more likely to demon-
strate bias when a trial is not racially charged and they are not re-
minded of race-related norms. Black jurors, on the other hand,
appear to be concerned about institutional bias in the legal system.
Many Black jurors seem to be chronically aware of the possibility of
bias in any case with a Black defendant, and this may lead to racial
preference in the form of same-race leniency. Of course, it is impor-
tant to recognize that the present analysis of Black jurors' decision
making relies in large part upon speculation. Absent additional data
collection using Black mock jurors-as well as more elaborated
theories pertaining to the race-related judgments and behavior of
non-Whites-it is difficult to assess these predictions regarding Black
jurors. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that as little as we may
know regarding the decision making processes of Black jurors, even
fewer social science studies have examined jurors of other racial
minority groups.
IV. RACE AND JURY DECISION MAKING
To this point, the studies reviewed in this Article have focused
exclusively on individual mock juror judgments. But in real trials
verdicts are rendered by deliberating groups, not individuals, and the
generalizability of mock juror research is often questionable because
it frequently ignores deliberation and group influence. Intuitively,
91. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story
Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 90 (1992).
92. Jones, supra note 87, at 254.
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however, the finding that individual judgments vary by juror race 93
leads to the jury-level hypothesis that racial composition can influ-
ence a jury's verdict. Specifically, if Black jurors are less likely than
White jurors to convict Blacks, then the greater the percentage of
Blacks on a jury, the less likely that jury should be to convict a Black
defendant. Supreme Court rulings such as Batson v. Kentucky, 94 in
which attorneys were prohibited from removing prospective jurors
from a jury panel simply because of their race, suggest a tacit accep-
tance of the premise that racial composition can affect the verdict a
jury reaches. 95 Jury reform movements have operated under a similar
assumption in proposing various strategies for ensuring racially
representative jury pools. 96 Even media reports about trials usually
include the racial composition of the jury as if it had an effect on the
final verdict. But mock jury studies are time-consuming, expensive,
and logistically complicated, and for these and other reasons, intui-
tions about the influence of racial composition on juries have rarely
been tested empirically.
A. Published Research on Race and Mock Juries
In one of the few experimental studies of race and deliberating
mock juries, Bernard presented college student juries with the video
of a simulated assault and battery trial.97 Two versions of the trial
were used, one with a White defendant and one with a Black defen-
dant. Ten twelve-person juries of differing racial compositions
viewed and then deliberated on the case. Results indicated that,
across both versions of the trial, White jurors were more likely to vote
to convict than Black jurors were, especially when the defendant was
Black. In fact, the only jury to reach a unanimous guilty verdict in the
93. See, e.g., Abwender & Hough, supra note 79; Skolnick & Shaw, supra note 38;
Ugwuegbu, supra note 76.
94. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
95. This conclusion is one that the Court has also failed to endorse on other occasions. For
example, in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Court ruled that race-based peremptory
challenges (a practice which had prevented a single Black juror from serving on a criminal jury
in Talladega County over the course of fifteen years) did not violate the rights of Black
defendants. The Court majority held that such challenges were constitutional as long as they
were not used in the attempt to deprive Black jurors of their right to jury service.
96. See, e.g., Avern Cohn & David R. Sherwood, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action in
Jury Selection, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323 (1999).
97. Bernard, supra note 14, at 107.
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study was also the only all-White jury to view the trial of a Black
defendant.98
These data support the intuition that the racial composition of a
jury can significantly affect its final verdict. However, this study
provides little insight into the process through which this influence
occurs, relying instead on a demographic argument: since jurors of
different races often view the same trial differently, racial composi-
tion can determine the predeliberation vote split and, eventually, the
jury's verdict. This explanation would be consistent with Kalven and
Zeisel's assertion that individual predeliberation votes are the best
predictors of a jury's eventual verdict99-a conclusion that has been
supported by more recent findings as well. 1°°
However, it is also possible that the process of deliberating de-
termines the influence of jury racial composition on jurors' judgments
and final verdicts. For example, Bernard reported one finding
concerning the influence of race on the deliberation process itself.101
Consistent with other studies that have observed a leniency shift after
deliberations, 102 he concluded that mock jurors' individual verdict
preferences became more lenient after deliberations. 10 3 The excep-
tion to this tendency was found among jurors on all-White juries,
whose verdict preferences were not affected at all by deliberating. It
is worth noting, though, that this result was based on a very small
sample size (only two all-White juries) and limited dependent meas-
ures, and Bernard himself offered no explanation for the finding.
Few researchers have more closely studied the influence that jury
composition and deliberations have on the private attitudes of
individual jurors, and those who have done so report contrasting
results. Lipton examined the effects of deliberations on Anglo and
Chicano jurors' judgments of a Chicano defendant.1°4 He found that
deliberations polarized jurors by race, rendering Anglo jurors even
more likely to convict than they had been beforehand, and Chicano
98. Id. at 109.
99. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 488 (1966).
100. See, e.g., Maria Sandys & Ronald C. Dillehay, First-Ballot Votes, Predeliberation
Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials, 19 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 175 (1995); Sarah
Tanford & Steven Penrod, Jury Deliberations: Discussion Content and Influence Processes in
Jury Decision Making, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 322 (1986).
101. Bernard, supra note 14, at 109.
102. See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury
Deliberation: Jurors' Bias for Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 687 (1988).
103. Bernard, supra note 14, at 109.
104. Lipton, supra note 72 ("Anglo" and "Chicano" are racial terms used by Lipton).
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jurors even more likely to acquit. Norbert Kerr and colleagues,
however, reported that the mere expectation of deliberating on a
racially mixed jury led White and Black mock jurors to be more
punitive towards a same-race defendant. 0 5 With these competing
predictions regarding the relationship between race, deliberations,
and juries, and with little data to speak directly to the issue, additional
investigation of race and jury deliberations is clearly warranted.
B. Possible Deliberation Influence Processes
Informational social influence is the most common explanation
for how a jury's racial composition might affect the deliberation
process itself.106 According to an informational explanation, the
nature of the informational exchange in the jury room (i.e., the
content of the discussion during deliberations) varies with the race of
the jurors involved. For example, racial composition might influence
the breadth of information considered by juries. Jurors of different
races not only tend to enter deliberations with different verdict
preferences, but they may also bring to the jury room different
personal experiences, social perspectives, and concrete knowledge.
Therefore, racially heterogeneous juries might be exposed to a wider
range of viewpoints and interpretations than jurors on homogeneous
juries. This prediction is consistent with Justice Thurgood Marshall's
ruling in Peters v. Kiff, in which he suggested that group-based
exclusion of jurors "deprives the jury of a perspective on human
events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be
presented."'0 7  Though many legal scholars have alluded to this
informational hypothesis, 0 8 little to no empirical evidence actually
exists in support of it.
It is also possible that jury composition affects deliberations
through non-informational means. A jury's racial composition may,
for example, trigger normative pressures regarding race by activating
jurors' motivations to avoid prejudice. This is a possibility that legal
scholars and judges have not often discussed, but it is consistent with
psychological research and theory regarding the influence of race on
social perception. For example, Kerr and colleagues provide evi-
105. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Defendant-Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments, 19 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 545 (1995).
106. See, e.g., Marder, supra note 8, at 678, 680.
107. 407 U.S. 493,503-04 (1972).
108. See, e.g., Marder, supra note 8, at 678 n.97.
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dence for the non-informational influence of race in the courtroom
through their finding that the mere expectation of deliberating on a
racially heterogeneous jury affected mock jurors' perceptions of
blameworthiness. 109 At the very least, this result suggests that jurors
may censor their public attitudes when they are on racially mixed
juries, though jurors' private evaluations of the evidence might also
be affected by motivational pressures.
Essentially, the knowledge that one is going to deliberate with
jurors of a different race might be yet another way in which racial
issues can be made salient for White jurors at trial. In our previous
research,110 White jurors' ratings of the evidence and of the Black
defendant's disposition changed significantly when race became a
salient trial issue. Whites rated the prosecution's case as weaker, the
defense's case as stronger, and the Black defendant's personality as
less threatening when the trial was racially charged. The knowledge
that they will eventually discuss the case with Black jurors might have
a similar effect on the race-related motivations of White jurors,
activating their concerns about prejudice and influencing their
processing and interpretation of the evidence.
Furthermore, membership on a racially heterogeneous jury
might also influence White jurors' behavior during deliberations. As
detailed above, one basis for the hypothesis that racially heterogene-
ous juries cover a wider range of information while deliberating is
that Black jurors tend to raise issues that White jurors do not. But it
is also possible that White jurors are more likely to think about
certain issues, and to raise them, when they are on diverse juries. If
the presence of Black jurors on the jury makes race a salient concern
for Whites, then White jurors may be more likely to bring up issues
such as racial profiling when they are on racially mixed juries. Given
that minorities (in terms of demographics as well as opinion) tend to
participate less than majority individuals during group discussions,
such a motivational explanation could prove useful in accounting for
the influence of racial composition on jury deliberations and ver-
dicts."'
109. See Kerr et al., supra note 105.
110. See Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 13; Sommers &
Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra note 13.
111. See, e.g., Catherine Kirchmeyer, Multicultural Task Groups: An Account of the Low
Contribution Level of Minorities, 24 SMALL GROUP RES. 127 (1993); Nancy S. Marder, Note,
Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J. 593 (1987).
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C. Future Directions
The vast majority of social science investigations of race and the
courtroom have focused on the judgments of individual mock jurors.
Although this work comprises an important aspect of research on
race and juries, additional mock jury studies are necessary in order to
answer questions regarding the influence of race-salience at the group
level, or the processes by which racial composition may affect delib-
erations. In concluding the present review of the social science
literature on race in the courtroom, we will end with one such mock
jury study that is unique in terms of its high level of realism and its
focus on the variables of race-salience and jury racial composition.
In this 2002 experiment, Sommers recruited jury-eligible citizens
as well as jury pool members from Washtenaw County, Michigan to
serve as participants. 112 Mock jurors were all shown the same video-
taped summary of a real rape trial with a Black defendant. In order
to create a more realistic simulation of the jury experience than is
common in psychological studies, participants completed a written
voir dire questionnaire before the trial video, received State of
Michigan jury instructions afterwards, and then deliberated on the
case as members of six-person juries.," These deliberations were
videotaped for later analysis. Other dependent measures in the study
were assessed via written questionnaire, including individual jurors'
predeliberation and postdeliberation verdict preferences; interpreta-
tions of and memory for the facts of the case; evaluations of attor-
neys, witnesses, and the defendant; and perceptions of the
deliberation process and performance of fellow jurors.
Although all mock juries watched the same trial video in this
study, there were two variables manipulated in the experimental
sessions. First, jurors received one of two different versions of the
voir dire questionnaire. Some jurors were asked about their racial
attitudes and general perceptions of racial bias in the legal system,
whereas other jurors received a questionnaire that made no explicit
reference to race or racial bias. This manipulation was intended to
test whether race-relevant voir dire questions are yet another way in
112. Samuel R. Sommers, Race and Juries: The Effects of Race-Salience and Racial
Composition on Individual and Group Decision-Making (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Michigan) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
113. Six-person juries were used instead of twelve-person juries because of practical
constraints, including the number of jury pool members available for the study and the physical
size and setup of the available deliberation room.
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which White jurors' concerns about racial bias can be made salient.
For example, one question in the race-relevant voir dire question-
naire read: "The defendant in the case is African-American and the
victims are White. How might this affect your perceptions of the
trial?" Another race-relevant question read: "In your opinion, how
does the race of a defendant influence the treatment s/he receives in
the legal system as a whole? ''1 4
The purpose of these race-relevant voir dire questions was not to
identify jurors who were likely to exhibit racial bias in their judg-
ments; as detailed in the introduction to this Article, people are
frequently unable or unwilling to accurately predict how race will
affect their judgments."' Rather, these race-relevant voir dire ques-
tions were designed to force mock jurors to think about their racial
attitudes and, more generally, about social norms against racial
prejudice and institutional bias in the legal system. Results indicated
that the race-relevant voir dire questions did influence jurors' subse-
quent perceptions of the trial. Specifically, both White and Black
mock jurors were less likely to vote to convict the Black defendant
after experiencing a race-relevant voir dire.1 6 These findings demon-
strate yet one more way in which jurors' concerns about race can be
made salient at trial, and confirm our earlier findings that when race
is made salient to Whites, they are less likely to be influenced by it."7
The second variable manipulated in this experiment was the ra-
cial composition of the mock juries. In order to examine the influ-
ence of jury composition on the deliberation process, half of the mock
juries were all-White, and the other half were racially mixed, with
four White and two Black members.1 8  Sommers examined the
influence of racial composition by comparing the trial judgments of
individual jurors on the racially homogeneous and heterogeneous
juries, and by examining the content and tone of the videotaped
deliberations. These analyses served as a rare empirical test of the
prediction that information exchange during deliberation differs
114. Sommers, supra note 112, at 63.
115. See Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 9.
116. Sommers, supra note 112, at 71.
117. Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 13, at 1373; Sommers &
Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra note 13, at 217.
118. Of course, it would also be interesting and useful to examine the decision making of
predominantly Black juries or juries with equal numbers of White and Black jurors. However,
the demographics of the Washtenaw County, Michigan jury pool rendered it practically
impossible to include in this investigation a substantial number of mock juries with more than
two Black jurors.
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depending on the composition of a jury-a hypothesis that has been
proposed but not tested by judges and legal scholars, who have
typically relied on the assumption that during deliberations, "people
of different backgrounds contribute different perspectives in ways
that are unknowable but nevertheless significant."119 The design of
this experiment also allowed for the examination of motivational or
non-informational influences of jury composition on jurors.
Analysis of the videotaped deliberations indicated that the racial
composition of the jury influenced the content and scope of the
discussions. Compared to all-White juries, racially mixed juries
tended to deliberate longer, discuss more case facts, and bring up
more questions about what was missing from the trial (e.g., physical
evidence that was not presented, witnesses who did not testify).
Racially mixed juries were also more likely to discuss racial issues
such as racial profiling during deliberations, and more often than not,
Whites on these heterogeneous juries were the jurors who raised
these issues.120 To our knowledge, these findings are the first in the
mock jury literature to provide empirical support for the assumption
that jury diversity leads to a greater breadth of perspectives discussed
during deliberations.1 21
The Sommers study also demonstrated that jury composition
could have a non-informational influence on jurors. Immediately
after watching the trial video and hearing jury instructions, individual
mock jurors were asked to indicate their predeliberation verdict
preference by circling either "Not Guilty" or "Guilty" on an anony-
mous, written questionnaire. Analysis of these responses indicated
that even before deliberations, White jurors on racially mixed juries
were less likely to vote to convict the Black defendant than White
jurors on all-White juries.2 2 In other words, simply knowing that they
would be discussing the case with a racially heterogeneous group was
sufficient to influence jurors' private judgments. This result suggests
that membership on a racially mixed jury might be another way in
which White jurors' motivations to avoid prejudice are activated,
thereby affecting subsequent trial judgments.
This conclusion is also supported by Sommers' findings regarding
White jurors' willingness to discuss the possibility of racial bias (with
119. Marder, supra note 8, at 668.
120. Sommers, supra note 112, at 108.
121. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Marder, supra note 8, at 678, 680.
122. Sommers, supra note 112, at 71-74.
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regard to the case in question or the criminal justice system in gen-
eral) during deliberations. Data indicated that White jurors on
racially mixed juries were more amenable to discussion of such racial
issues, perhaps because they started thinking about racial bias and
their own racial attitudes as soon as they saw the racial composition
of their jury. On the other hand, when race or the possibility of racial
bias came up during the deliberations of all-White juries, other jurors
were likely to change the subject or attempt to dismiss these concerns
as irrelevant.123 Absent salient normative cues regarding racism,
jurors on all-White juries seemed surprised by a fellow juror's men-
tion of race and relatively unmotivated and unwilling to discuss the
topic during deliberations. Taken together, the results of this study
demonstrate the potential for racial composition to influence a jury's
deliberations and final verdict through both informational and
motivational means.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
It is our hope that this Article not only illustrates the usefulness
of social science methodology for drawing causal conclusions about
race and juries, but also places these experiments within a more
theoretical framework. In doing so, we seek to correct many of the
misconceptions that judges and legal writers may have held regarding
the number of these studies and the uniformity of their findings. One
conclusion of our review of this literature is that there is currently less
there than meets the eye. For instance, many of the studies com-
monly cited include only White participants. These studies can tell us
something about whether White jurors are affected by a defendant's
race, but nothing about whether Whites and Blacks behave differ-
ently. Our review suggests that White jurors are indeed influenced by
a defendant's race, but this influence is not consistent across cases.
Contrary to common assumption,'2 4 obviously racially charged trials
may not be the ones in which racial bias is most likely. Psychological
research and theory suggest that White juror bias may be a more
serious concern in run-of-the-mill cases when racial issues are not
salient and White jurors are not alerted to the need to guard against
prejudice. In the few studies that have included enough Black jurors
to allow for meaningful statistical comparisons by juror race, a
123. Id. at 109.
124. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); King, supra note 14, at 100 n.138.
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different pattern emerges. Black mock jurors seem to be influenced
by a defendant's race regardless of the salience of racial issues at trial,
suggesting that additional theory and research is needed in order to
better predict the motivations and judgments of minority jurors.
The present Article also examines the intuition that the racial
composition of a jury can affect its deliberations and final verdict.
Despite frequent suggestions that diverse juries lead to a diversity of
perspectives during deliberations,'21 very little research has actually
tested this hypothesis until a recent study conducted by one of the
present authors.126 The results of this experiment, which used actual
jury pool members as participants, indicate that the effects of racial
heterogeneity on jury deliberations are not limited to the addition of
the contributions and perspectives of minority jurors. To the con-
trary, this experiment demonstrates that racial diversity has a signifi-
cant effect on the judgments of White jurors and on their
contributions to deliberations. Before deliberations even began in
this study, White jurors' private opinions about the case were influ-
enced by the racial composition of the jury. In this sense, member-
ship on a racially mixed jury seems to be yet another way in which
concerns about race can be made salient for White jurors during a
trial. Furthermore, the actual content of the deliberations in this
study also varied based on jury composition, as racially mixed juries
had longer, more thorough deliberations than all-White juries. This
result also was not solely attributable to the behavior of Black jurors,
as White jurors on heterogeneous juries mentioned more factual
information and were more amenable to the discussion of racially
charged topics than were Whites on homogeneous juries. These
findings suggest fruitful future directions for investigating the proc-
esses through which race influences jury deliberations, and also
demonstrate the extent to which it is possible to create a realistic jury
simulation in a controlled, experimental setting.
We began this Article with a series of questions about race and
jury decisions that legal scholars and social scientists have attempted
to answer through a variety of empirical methods. Of course, crimi-
nal trials are complex enterprises consisting of myriad variables, and
the answers to such questions are rarely simple or definitive. For any
particular case, few researchers would dare claim that they could
predict exactly how and to what extent race will influence the final
125. See, e.g., Peters, 407 U.S. at 503; see also sources cited supra note 8.
126. Sommers, supra note 112.
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verdict. But through archival analysis, juror interviews, and mock
jury experiments- and we would argue for the importance of utilizing
all of these methods in answering any research question-a better
general understanding is emerging of the ways in which race can
affect juries and the circumstances under which such influence is
likely. And given the limitations of other available methodologies,
both in terms of the breadth of research questions they can address
and the types of conclusions they can reach, we have every reason to
believe that, in the future, social science research will continue to be
an essential component of the investigation of race and criminal
juries.
